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Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between changes in world agricultural prices, as well as the
changes in Russian exchange rates, and changes in Russian domestic consumer prices for various
foodstuffs.  The empirical heart of the paper is estimation of price and exchange rate
transmission elasticities (TEs) for Russia during 1994-1999 for the country’s major agricultural
imports, in particular the meats.
The estimated TEs are useful for two reasons.  The first is for forecasting purposes.  Predicting
changes in Russian agricultural production, consumption, and trade requires knowledge of price
and exchange rate transmission.  Commodity forecasting models for Russian agriculture, such as
that at the Economic Research Service of USDA, explicitly call for values for such parameters.
The second reason TE estimates are important is as performance indicators.  One of the main
objectives of Russian economic reform has been integration into the world economy.  TEs can
serve as measures of such integration.  The higher the estimated TEs, the greater is Russia’s
integration into world agricultural markets.
In this paper, TEs are computed for the 30 largest cities in Russia.  With the exception of the two
largest cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, which stand alone, the other 28 cities are grouped
into 4 regions depending on accessibility: ports, those on the Volga River, those on the Trans-
Siberian Railroad, and those that are truly “landlocked.”  The results show that TEs involving
both world prices and the exchange rate are low.  However, TE is strongest for Moscow and St.
Petersburg, which suggests that these cities have the best physical and commercial-institutional
infrastructure for bringing in imports.  The results indicate that Russia could significantly
increase its integration into world agricultural markets, thereby expanding its volumes of trade.3
Context
In the Soviet Union, foreign trade was a state monopoly, with state planners determining the mix
and volume of imports and exports.  The state also set domestic producer and consumer prices
(with just a few exceptions), including for goods to be exported and imported.  Although world
prices might have influenced the state price setters, no formal relationship existed between world
market and domestic prices.  The state also set the official exchange rates between the ruble and
foreign currencies.
1  Ruble exchange rates changed in response to changes in foreign rates only
to keep cross exchange rates involving the ruble equal.  (In other words, if the U.S. dollar rose by
10 percent vis-à-vis the Japanese yen, the Russian official exchange rates involving the dollar
and yen would be adjusted such that one dollar now bought 10 percent more rubles than did one
yen.)  Given the strong state control over domestic prices and exchange rates, transmission
between changes in (a) world market prices and exchange rates and (b) domestic prices, was
extremely low.
The economic reform that began in Russia in 1992 after the dissolution of the USSR ended the
state monopoly on foreign trade, generally freed domestic prices (though this did not happen
overnight and some price controls still remain), and created floating exchange rates (though the
float can be rather “dirty”).  During the period of estimation in this paper (1994-99), formal
controls on agricultural trade at the national level were not (as they still are not) overly
restrictive.  Most tariffs on agricultural imports ranged from 5 to 20 percent, though some were
as high as 30 percent.  Quotas and other quantitative restrictions have been virtually nonexistent.
State trading does not formally exist, though some of the agencies that administered the
country’s foreign trade during the Soviet period and have now become privatized retain close
links to the state.
2  Thus, for certain products behavior akin to state trading might exist to some
degree.  Nonetheless, at the national level agricultural trade has not been overly controlled.  For
                                               
1 For more information as to how foreign trade was planned and managed in the Soviet Union, see Gregory and
Stuart.
2 For more information concerning agricultural trade restrictions during the transition period, see OECD.4
this reason, one could hypothesize that price transmission between the world and domestic
markets is fairly high.
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the main reasons TE estimates are useful is for
forecasting purposes.  The importance of accurate values for TEs in forecasting depends on the
degree to which forecasters will assume that world agricultural trade prices and the Russian
exchange rate will fluctuate over the projection period.  This in turn will in large part depend on
the volatility of these variables in the recent past.  During the transition period both world
agricultural prices and Russian exchange rates have fluctuated considerably.  Generally
speaking, world agricultural prices rose substantially from 1993 to 1997, but then plunged.  For
example, U.S. export prices for a ton of wheat in 1994, 1996, and 1999 equaled $4.09, $5.63, and
$3.04 per bushel, respectively (ERS, Agricultural Outlook, various issues).
In the early reform years of 1992-93, the Russian ruble depreciated severely vis-à-vis Western
currencies in both nominal and real terms.  From 1994 to 1998, the ruble then appreciated in real
terms by about 75 percent (PlanEcon).  However, following the economic crisis of 1998, the
ruble quickly depreciated in both nominal and real terms, though recently it has begun again to
appreciate in real terms.  The instability of both world agricultural prices and Russian exchange
rate justifies forecasting assumptions that the values will not be stable in the future.  This
increases the importance of the “accuracy” of the values for TEs used in the forecasting models.
The importance of TEs in forecasting Russia’s agricultural trade depends also on how important
such trade is in volume terms to both the Russian and world economies.  The Soviet Union was a
large importer of grain and soybeans and soybean meal, often taking 20-25 percent of total world
imports of these products.  Because of the severe downsizing of the livestock sector during
transition, grain and oilseed imports by Russia and the other countries of the former USSR have
fallen substantially.  However, Russia has become a major importer of meat—beef, pork, and5
poultry (see table 1 at the end of the paper).  During the last five years imports have supplied
about one third of the country’s total consumption of meat.  Russia has accounted for 15-20
percent of the world’s total meat imports.  Other agricultural products on which Russia is heavily
import dependent are sugar and vegetable oil.  However, unlike meat and vegetable oil, sugar is
supplied mainly by another country of the former USSR (Ukraine), with volume levels and
prices largely negotiated by the two countries.
Methodology and Data
In this paper the TE for a good is defined as the percent change in the Russian consumer price
for the product divided by the percent change in the world price (or exchange rate).  A value of 1
gives complete transmission, a value of 0 no transmission.
In real terms, price transmission for a good is measured by estimating the following equation
with ordinary least squares:












b1 is the estimated price TE, while b2  is the estimated exchange rate TE.  Pd and Pf are the
domestic and foreign price of the good, respectively, and CPId and CPIf are the domestic and
foreign consumer price index, respectively.  The real exchange rate e* equals the product of the
nominal exchange rate and the ratio of foreign to domestic CPI.
In calculating the TEs for prices, we use real as opposed to nominal prices.  Likewise in
calculating the TEs for the exchange rate, we use the real as opposed to nominal rate.
 When the real exchange rate is stable, as some of the simpler theories of purchasing power
parity maintain, measures of price transmission that use either real or nominal prices will
generally yield the same results (Mundlak and Larson).  However, the financial crisis in August
1998 (the worst of many financial crises that hit over the reform period from 1992 through 1999)
caused a significant depreciation of the ruble in real terms.  This depreciation affected the6
relationship between world and domestic prices for goods because of developments that were not
specific to, and did not originate within, the markets for these goods.  Accounting for changes in
the real exchange rate is one way of separating out economy-wide disruptions from market-
specific events when calculating the transmission of prices from world to domestic markets.
Estimates are made for three products:  beef, pork, and vegetable oil.  These products are chosen
for two reasons.  The first is that imports constitute a large share of domestic consumption, and
the second that the bulk of imports come from OECD countries.  For example, in 1997 about 30
percent of all meat and 40 of vegetable oil consumed in Russia was imported, with OECD
countries providing over 90 percent of the imports.  However, of the meats, poultry is the most
heavily imported.  During the last 5 years imports have provided over half of domestic
consumption, with the bulk of the imports coming from the United States.  Sales to Russia have
in fact accounted for about half of all U.S. poultry exports.  We regrettably do not include
poultry in our study, for the simple reason that the Russians began reporting prices by region for
poultry only in October 1998, too late for our work.
TEs are computed separately for 30 of the largest cities in Russia, which are divided into four
categories based on their geographic accessibility with respect to the “world market.”  The
categories are: (1) cities that are sea ports; (2) cities on the Volga River; (3) cities on the Trans-
Siberian Railroad; and (4) “landlocked” cities.  Aggregate estimates for each of the four city
categories are determined by averaging the estimates for all the cities within the category, using
the cities’ populations as weights.
Moscow and St. Petersburg are not included in any of the 4 city categories, but rather stand
alone.  Because of their size and privileged status during the Soviet period, these two cities have
the best internal infrastructure—both physical and commercial-institutional—vis-à-vis the world
market.  This means that the cost of shipping imported foodstuffs from importation ports to these7
cities is low compared to costs for other cities.  St. Petersburg is in fact a major port, with
facilities that can handle large import volumes at relatively low cost.  Since superior
infrastructure would appear to allow for greater integration into world markets and thus higher
TE, separating these cities out from the others seems appropriate.
The methodology requires data on domestic consumer prices, world prices, the CPI, and
exchange rates.  The Russian Ministry of Agriculture has collected domestic prices for beef, pork
and vegetable oil for markets in 80 Russian cities (mainly capitals of the various 88 oblasts,
republics, and autonomous districts) monthly from January 1994 to December 1999.  All 30
cities for which we make calculations are included in the data set.
The “world prices” for goods are unit prices at the border for imports into Russia, computed
from the import value and volume data in Tamozhennaia Statistika, the quarterly foreign trade
publication of the Russian State Customs Committee.  The publication reports all import (as well
as export) values in U.S. dollars.  Russia’s State Statistical Committee Goskomstat provides the
Russian CPI and the ruble exchange rates, while the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the
U.S. CPI.
We index the nominal domestic prices by the Russian CPI and then average them into quarterly
prices so that they can be compared with the quarterly border prices.  We calculate the real
exchange rate by multiplying the ruble/dollar exchange rate by the ratio of the U.S. to Russian
CPI.
Because all the data used in this study are non-stationary, the standard deviation calculations of
the OLS regression have non-standard distributions.  In the context of cointegration analysis
Wald tests can be developed that yield standard deviations with standard normal distributions.8
The authors are currently carrying out these tests on the above data; preliminary results seem to
be consistent with the results reported below.
Results
The results (table 2) indicate that TEs involving both world prices and the exchange rate are low.
The vast bulk of estimates for product-city pairings are less than 50 percent, and for most
estimates below even 25 percent.  The results indicate that Russia could significantly increase its
integration into world agricultural markets, thereby expanding its volumes of trade.  As
discussed earlier, Russia in the aggregate is a net agricultural importer vis-à-vis the developed
Western countries.  From a forecasting point of view, therefore, one could predict that Russian
imports from Western countries could rise substantially, assuming it made the reform changes
(discussed later) that raise price transmission.  The commodity forecasting model for Russia of
the Economic Research Service currently uses a price transmission elasticity for all agricultural
products of 0.5.  The results in this paper suggest that this value might be on the high side, or at
least should be no higher.
The results do not show much difference between TE for world prices and the exchange rate.
The main difference involving the results is that the estimates for vegetable oil are relatively high
throughout the country (between 0.25 and 0.5 for most product-city pairings), while the estimates
for beef and pork are relatively high for only Moscow and St. Petersburg.  (The one exception to
the higher estimates for these two cities for meat is the extremely low estimate of 0.02 for price
TE for pork for Moscow.)  One reason we should expect TE to be higher for vegetable oil than
for meat throughout the country is that unlike meat, vegetable oil is non-perishable.  It thereby
can penetrate to more isolated internal markets with much less risk of spoilage.
However, there are two other likely reasons why TE is higher for Moscow and St. Petersburg,
reasons which are revealing about the success of economic reform in Russia to date in creating9
well-functioning markets for agricultural goods.  The first reason is that many regional
governments throughout the country adopt policies that have the effect of segmenting internal
agricultural markets.  Such policies include restrictions on prices and profit margins for local
producers.  The most common restrictive policy is controls on outflows of regional agricultural
output.  There are probably a number of reasons for this policy, the most benign being that the
regions wish to protect their own consumers by ensuring that local food supplies are adequate.
The most malign-possible reason is corruption, as officials might be exploiting the regional price
differences created by these restrictions to earn easy arbitrage profits.  We discussed earlier that
agricultural trade restrictions in Russia at the national level are not extreme.  However, regional
controls on agriculture—on prices, profits margins, and most importantly outflows--segment
regional markets from each other, as well as reduce integration into world agricultural markets,
as revealed by low price transmission.
The second reason TE is lower for interior markets compared to Moscow and St. Petersburg is
undeveloped internal infrastructure for moving agricultural goods internally (which also
contributes to domestic market segmentation).  Although storage is also inadequate, the main
weakness is transportation, particularly the poor road system.  The cost of shipping agricultural
products between regions can exceed producer prices.  Deficient transportation and storage
increase the risk of spoilage for perishables such as meat.
An equally serious problem is deficient commercial and institutional infrastructure.  Producers
and traders in particular need a financial system that allows fast and affordable access to capital,
a system for quick and inexpensive dissemination of market information (where can one buy and
sell, and at what price?), and a strong system of commercial law that protects property and
enforces contracts.  The absence of this market infrastructure increases the costs and risks of10
producing and, in particular, selling output—that is, it raises the transaction costs of doing
business.
3
A number of empirical studies provide evidence of segmentation of regional agriculture and food
markets in Russia.  The strongest evidence has been poor price cointegration between regions—
that is, substantial variation in food prices between regions that cannot be explained by transport
costs (see Gardner and Brooks and Berkowitz 1998 and 1999).
4  Internal price cointegration and
price transmission between world and domestic markets both serve as indicators of the degree to
which Russia has created a well-functioning and open domestic agricultural economy.  The
relatively low results that research has found for both domestic price cointegration and price
transmission show that much more progress is necessary to meet this reform objective.
There are understandable reasons why TE is higher for Moscow and St. Petersburg than for the
“hinterland.”  If surplus producing regions within Russia restrict agricultural outflows and the
internal infrastructure for moving agricultural goods from surplus to deficit regions is poor, then
cities and regions within the country that must rely on food inflows—with Moscow and St.
Petersburg being at the top of the list--have strong incentive both to minimize any possible
policy impediments to food imports and to improve the physical and institutional infrastructure
for bringing in food imports.  The Soviet Union was also a food importer, with much of the
imports going to Moscow, Leningrad (the Soviet name for St. Petersburg), and other large cities.
These cities therefore inherited from the Soviet period a relatively well-developed infrastructural
system for delivering imported foodstuffs.  In the case of St. Petersburg, which is a major port
with relatively close access to European food markets, the physical infrastructure for handling
imports is the quality of its own port facilities.
                                               
3 Further discussion of the problems that weak institutional infrastructure creates for agricultural development in the
transition countries can be found in a forthcoming ERS study, Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition
Countries (Liefert and Swinnen).
4 The Europe, Africa, and Middle East Branch of ERS is also currently researching price cointegration within
Russia.11
Higher TEs computed for Moscow and St. Petersburg are consistent with the higher reliance of
these cities on food imports.  As just argued, the greater the degree to which a city or region
depends on food imports, the more incentive it has to reduce the policy and physical and
institutional impediments to trade that will hinder its access to world agricultural markets, as
measured by price transmission.  The Economic Research Service has calculated that in Russia
in 1997, imports accounted for only about 20 percent of all food consumed (Agricultural
Outlook, ERS, June-July 1999, p. 17).  However, the general evidence shows that imports
provide over half of all food consumed in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
5
Conclusion
This paper finds that the transmission of changes in both world agricultural prices and the
Russian exchange rate to domestic consumer prices for foodstuffs is low.  This indicates that
Russia could significantly increase its integration into world agricultural markets, thereby
expanding its volumes of trade.  However, transmission is stronger for Moscow and St.
Petersburg than for cities in the “hinterland.”  This suggests that these cities have adopted fewer
policies that impede integration into world agricultural markets, as well as have better physical
and commercial-institutional infrastructure for bringing in imported foodstuffs.
                                               
5 A misconception has developed during the transition period that imports account for over half of all food
consumed within Russia.  The likely reason for this misconception is that observers are extrapolating the experience
of Moscow and St. Petersburg, which do import over half of their food, to the entire country.  Our low TE
calculations are consistent with the ERS finding that imports do not provide the bulk of Russia’s food supplies.  A
high overall national dependence on food imports would indicate that Russia relies on, and is therefore heavily
integrated into, world agricultural markets.  Our TE calculations suggest the opposite.12
Table 1:  Russian Agricultural Imports
values in millions of U.S. dollars
volumes in thousands of tons
1998 1999 2000
volume value volume value volume value
Meat
beef 411 606 522 549 271 338
pork 282 448 444 407 213 212
poultry 814 563 236 154 688 367
Grain 1,448 249 6,290 632 4,317 551
Oilseeds 116 41 299 89 120 47
Sugar 4,248 1,334 6,204 1,256 5,050 765
Vegetables 1,202 343 1,725 361 1,353 312
Fruit 1,290 720 854 439 1,239 657
Other 5,969 3,774 3,727
Total Ag and Food imports 10,273 7,661 6,976
Source:  World Trade Atlas13
Table 2:  Price and Real Exchange Rate Transmission Elasticities
PTE* ERTE* PTE ERTE PTE ERTE
Moscow 0.34 0.46 0.02 0.28 0.26 0.34
St. Petersburg 0.51 0.57 0.48 0.34 0.40 0.46
Ports -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.19 0.30 0.19
On the Volga 0.17 0.03 0.03 -0.12 0.27 0.14
On Trans-Siberian railroad -0.16 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.47 0.24
Landlocked -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.32 0.33
*PTE is the price transmission elasticity
 ERTE is the real exchange rate transmission elasticity
The data used in this study are non-stationary, so standard deviations have a non-standard distribution.  
Consequently, we do not report standard deviations in table 2.
Beef Pork Vegetable oil14
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